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Abstract: Autocrats depend on a capable secret police. Anecdotal evidence, however, often characterizes agents as surprisingly
mediocre in skill and intellect. To explain this puzzle, this article focuses on the career incentives underachieving individuals
face in the regular security apparatus. Low-performing officials in hierarchical organizations have little chance of being
promoted or filling lucrative positions. To salvage their careers, these officials are willing to undertake burdensome secret
police work. Using data on all 4,287 officers who served in autocratic Argentina (1975–83), we study biographic differences
between secret police agents and the entire recruitment pool. We find that low-achieving officers were stuck within the
regime hierarchy, threatened with discharge, and thus more likely to join the secret police for future benefits. The study
demonstrates how state bureaucracies breed mundane career concerns that produce willing enforcers and cement violent
regimes. This has implications for the understanding of autocratic consolidation and democratic breakdown.
Replication Materials: The data and materials required to verify the computational reproducibility of the results,
procedures and analyses in this article are available on the American Journal of Political Science Dataverse within the
Harvard Dataverse Network, at: https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/PGFOXW.
“We don’t want clever people. We want medio-
crities.”
—Officer, Greek Military Police1
Autocracies are notorious for their systematicviolation of civil liberties and human rights(e.g., Davenport 2007; Frantz and Kendall-Taylor
2014; Valentino 2004). At the core of autocratic repres-
sion stand secret police forces (Arendt 2017; Friedrich
and Brzezinski 1965). For centuries, regimes have made
extensive use of and largely depended on the loyalty of
such organizations (Baldwin 1934; Greitens 2016; Plate
and Darvi 1982). Charged with the responsibility to pro-
tect the regime from internal and external threats, secret
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1The quote refers to the recruitment practice of the Greek secret police (Amnesty International 1977, 31).
police forces run extensive spying networks to surveil and
detect conspiring enemies within the elite, the security
apparatus, and society at large. Acting on the suspicion
of subversion, units such as Czar Nicholas’s Okhrana,
Hitler’s Gestapo, or Assad’s Air Force Intelligence Direc-
torate detained, tortured, and even killed their victims.
The relentless persecution of opponents makes secret
police forces indispensable for the survival of autocratic
regimes. All the more surprising is that historical stud-
ies describe secret police agents as remarkably mediocre
in skill and intellect. Many members of Stalin’s NKVD,
for example, appear to have been poorly educated, lacking
the capability of other Soviet bureaucrats (Gregory 2009).
This resonates with piecemeal information hinting at the
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poor quality of secret police officers in other countries
(Browder 1996; Persak and Kamiński 2005; Plate and
Darvi 1982).2 However, whether underqualified agents
systematically dominated the secret police in any of these
cases is still unknown. Notwithstanding this open empir-
ical question, theoretical work rationalizes why dictators
might staff key security organizations with incompetent
agents (Egorov and Sonin 2011; Zakharov 2016). They
suggest that leaders strategically recruit less-skilled of-
ficials, whom they deem to be more loyal. We advance
these arguments by dissecting the supply side in the re-
cruitment of agents to explain why underachievers want
to join the secret police in the first place and why leaders
accept them.
We argue that the organizational structure of the reg-
ular security apparatus3 produces career incentives for
less-skilled officials to work in the secret police. In hierar-
chical organizations, officials with only mediocre achieve-
ments in the early stages of their career have little chance
of being promoted and gaining lucrative positions either
inside or outside the coercive bureaucracy. This generates
strong career pressures for underachieving but aspira-
tional officials to demonstrate commitment. The ardu-
ous nature of secret police work offers underachievers the
opportunity to signal their value to the regime and get
ahead of competitors for higher positions. Leaders can
exploit these incentives and staff their secret police with
zealous officials.
Our theory makes sense of recruitment in regimes
with and without salient social cleavages. Studies sug-
gest that in countries with politicized divisions between
classes, religions, or ethnicities, autocrats recruit secu-
rity personnel from favored social groups (Albrecht and
Ohl 2016; Greitens 2016; Hassan 2017; Sassoon 2016).
Leaders expect these individuals to follow repressive or-
ders out of their shared interest in the regime’s survival.
Our organizational perspective explains which individu-
als within these societal segments are most likely to join
the secret police. In many other countries, sectarian or
social cleavages are too weak or the favored groups too
large and heterogeneous to predict individual loyalty. By
focusing on the career incentives universal to coercive bu-
reaucracies, our argument also explains which agents are
willing to join secret police forces in states without such
divisions.
2Cases include Czechoslovakia, Germany, Greece, Iran, Paraguay,
Poland, Romania, South Africa, and Uruguay.
3Security apparatus and coercive bureaucracy refer to the state’s body
of formal security organizations, such as military, police, and in-
telligence agencies.
To test our theory, we draw on Argentina’s last dicta-
torship. The case allows us to study secret police recruit-
ment in a country where sectarian cleavages are absent
and respective social classes too large to offer a mean-
ingful rationale for the selection of agents. Our analysis
offers systematic evidence on the composition of Intelli-
gence Battalion 601—the most notorious and powerful
secret police unit in the history of Argentina. Between
1975 and 1983, Battalion 601 was the operative brain
behind the surveillance, detention, and forced disappear-
ance of thousands of Argentine citizens, while assuming
a leading role in Operation Condor—a secret rendition
network among right-wing dictatorships that targeted in-
dividuals across the Western Hemisphere (Dinges 2004;
Ministerio de Justicia y Derechos Humanos [Ministry of
Justice and Human Rights; MJyDH] 2015).
We collect and analyze original microlevel data on
the profiles of officials to find out why individuals want
to serve in units designed to oppress societies. To the best
of our knowledge, this is the first empirical study on the
enrollment of secret police agents. Combining informa-
tion from various archival sources, we compile a data set
of more than 4,000 military officers who constituted the
entire recruitment pool for the Argentine secret police.
These officers represent all individuals who entered the
officer corps between 1947 and 1975. We link this infor-
mation with recently released data on all agents working
in Battalion 601 to study biographic differences between
secret police members and their peers in all other parts
of the army. The results from our analysis offer strong
support for our theoretical expectation and corroborate
each part of our theoretical mechanism. Overall, we find
that officers who were under severe pressure due to poor
performance in their early career stages were more likely
to join Battalion 601.
Adopting an organizational perspective, this study
offers unique insights into the institutional anatomy of
authoritarian regimes. Despite the importance and long-
lasting consequences of secret police forces for politi-
cal regimes and domestic societies, the systematic study
of such organizations has been hampered by sparse and
unreliable information (Barros 2016; Policzer 2009). We
expose the clandestine organization at the center of a dic-
tatorship and scrutinize the individual agents who serve
in it. Other than psychological predispositions, deep ide-
ological convictions, or strong ethnic identities, we iden-
tify mundane but universal career concerns as a prime
motivator for officials to engage in arduous secret po-
lice work. Leaders exploit these incentives to maximize
compliance within organizations that require high lev-
els of operational autonomy to carry out their tasks but
that are otherwise difficult to control. Career pressures
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therefore serve regimes as the lubricant of their repressive
machines.
Research on Dictators and Coercive
Agents
Studies on coercive institutions usually assume the
perspective of governments that are concerned about
disobedience within the security apparatus (Bellin 2004;
Gregory 2009; Greitens 2016; Hassan 2017; Quinlivan
1999). For autocratic governments, disobedient secret
police forces are particularly dangerous, as their refusal to
carry out orders commonly marks the end of the leader’s
rule (Dragu and Przeworski 2019). Secret police agents
uncover conspiracies and protect the regime against
internal and external enemies, which makes leaders
vulnerable to resistance from within those organizations
(Greitens 2016; Plate and Darvi 1982). Noncompliance
in the core repressive unit reveals the government’s weak-
ness and enables opposition groups, rival regime elites,
and other security forces to turn against it (Albrecht and
Ohl 2016; DeMeritt 2015; Dragu and Lupu 2018).
Leaders seek to prevent these risks with utmost vigor.
To deter disobedience and increase the compliance of
agents, dictators set up monitoring systems and impose
draconian punishments (Gregory 2009; Quinlivan 1999;
Sudduth 2017). Yet, control mechanisms are known to be
largely ineffective (Brehm and Gates 1999). Monitoring
does not alter the preferences of subordinates, and many
governments lack the resources to identify and sanction
rogue officials (Cole 2015; Conrad and Moore 2010).4
Such control problems are particularly pronounced with
regard to secret police forces (Greitens 2016; Policzer
2009). By design, these units operate in secrecy and
with great autonomy to be effective—by necessity, they
are experts in espionage and counterespionage (Plate
and Darvi 1982, 85–101). As a result, even parallel
security forces often struggle to control the secret units
ultimately responsible for the regime’s protection (Dragu
and Przeworski 2019; Gregory 2009). This makes it
inherently difficult to keep the secret police in check,
and it often allowed these organizations to accumulate
tremendous powers—turning them into what some have
termed a “state within the state” (Arendt 2017, 556) or
a bureaucratic “monster” (Stepan 1988, 16).
Because of these control problems and the devastat-
ing consequences from secret police failure, for rulers
4Training and indoctrination do not guarantee obedience either,
as they imperfectly replace personal preferences, which exacerbates
control problems if agents enjoy large autonomy (Scharpf 2018).
the selection of agents is highly important. Discrim-
inating among security personnel, regimes commonly
fill units with officials deemed most suitable (Bellin
2004; Harkness 2016). One might therefore expect that
leaders select the brightest and most capable bureaucrats
to serve in the secret police (Baldwin 1934; McMahon and
Slantchev 2015). Anecdotal evidence, however, suggests
otherwise. For example, in communist Poland, members
of the Bezpieka secret police have been described as “ex-
tremely undereducated,” with “no political or social expe-
rience” (Dudek and Paczkowski 2005, 242–43). Accounts
of the czarist Okhrana, Lenin’s Cheka, Hitler’s Security
Service, the State Security of Czechoslovakia, and other
organizations hint at similar patterns (Blažek and Žáček
2005; Browder 1996; Zuckerman 1996). In view of the fact
that regimes depend on an effective secret police, these
historical descriptions are puzzling.
Two strands of research speak to the recruitment of
incompetent officials. The literature on nepotist regimes
conceives the selection of low-skilled agents as an unin-
tended side effect of the leader’s recruitment decisions.
Regarding the assignment of top officials, studies empha-
size the centrality of personal connections to the ruler
(Slater 2003; Taylor 2011). Sassoon (2016, 124–25), for
example, describes how Saddam Hussein appointed his
family members to lead the intelligence services irrespec-
tive of their expertise. As it is impossible to fill entire
organizations with friends and relatives, dictators have
been argued to staff important units with members of the
social groups deemed most loyal. Both General Qaddafi
and President Assad reportedly drew on aligned religious
minorities and ethnic tribes to maximize loyalty among
their security forces (Quinlivan 1999).
However, ethnicity and socioeconomic class are
broad categories that offer only limited information on
the personal interests and future behavior of individu-
als. It is unknown which markers leaders use to select
agents from within favored segments of society. Accord-
ing to Sassoon (2016, 124), even in countries with highly
politicized social cleavages, such as Iraq and Syria, the
composition of security organizations is more heteroge-
neous than is commonly assumed—a fact that current
studies do not explain. Furthermore, in many countries,
highly salient ethnic cleavages are absent or leaders lack
allied socioeconomic strata. In the absence of politically
exploitable cleavages, it is unknown how regimes staff
their core repressive units.
The second strand of research explicitly discusses po-
tential trade-offs between competence and loyalty to ex-
plain why leaders might deliberately employ low-skilled
agents. According to Egorov and Sonin (2011), leaders
fear that smart officials use their competence to oust them
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in the future.5 Zakharov (2016), in turn, expects skilled
agents to remain idle once their ruler is in danger, be-
cause they consider themselves indispensable under any
successor regime. Together, this suggests that leaders have
a strategic incentive to select less competent secret police
agents for the sake of greater loyalty. Our theory comple-
ments and refines these arguments. It dissects the supply
side of organizational recruitment to explain why under-
achieving officials want to join the secret police in the first
place. We show that career pressures inherent to regular
security organizations drive the very individuals preferred
by dictators into the secret police.
A Theory of Careers within Coercive
Institutions
We first examine inherent characteristics of the state’s
coercive bureaucracy, which typically constitutes the re-
cruitment pool for the secret police, in order to explain
how organizational bottlenecks create career pressures
for officials with a hitherto weak track record. We then
describe why burdensome secret police service offers un-
derachieving officials the opportunity to advance their
career and why leaders are likely to accept them into the
secret police.
Historically, many secret police forces have recruited
personnel from the regime’s larger security apparatus—
including the military, gendarmeries, police departments,
and conventional intelligence agencies (Browder 1996;
Gregory 2009; Greitens 2016; Persak and Kamiński 2005;
Sassoon 2016; Zuckerman 1996). These security organi-
zations share three general characteristics that shape the
career trajectories and incentives of officials. First, the
organizations are hierarchically structured. Members of
such institutions generally strive for promotions because
rank within the hierarchy determines the amount of per-
sonal power, pay, and social prestige (Baker, Jensen, and
Murphy 1988, 599; Svolik 2012, 168–69).6
5In contrast to Egorov and Sonin (2011), McMahon and Slantchev
(2015) argue that leaders always have an incentive to hire skilled
guardians, while limiting their resources. Rulers would hire incom-
petent agents only if they mistakenly considered them competent.
As the authors point out, constituent components of the studies’
proposed mechanisms are barely quantifiable and have thus not
been systematically tested (Egorov and Sonin 2011, 906; McMahon
and Slantchev 2015, 307–11).
6Top positions in coercive bureaucracies often entail perks, includ-
ing priority health care and luxurious housing (Bellin 2004; Brooks
1998), or grant access to exclusive networks of corruption or illegal
activities (Droz-Vincent 2007).
Second, the organizations are pyramid shaped, with
an abundance of positions at the bottom but only few
lucrative posts at the top (Blau and Scott 2003, 32). Of-
ficials striving for promotion face a declining number
of available positions at each career step, and only few
individuals can ascend to the highest ranks. These built-
in bottlenecks generate competition among junior and
midlevel officials for senior billets (Kung and Chen 2011,
29–31). The career pressures are especially pronounced
in security organizations with “up-or-out” promotion
systems, in which individuals who have been repeatedly
passed over for promotion are threatened with forced re-
tirement to make way for the next cohort (Baker, Jensen,
and Murphy 1988, 604–5).
Third, in pyramid-shaped organizations, officials
climb up the hierarchy until they reach a position where
they are no longer competitive against their peers of equal
rank (Lazear 2004, 160). Leaders value both competence
and loyalty; both traits can be bases for promotion. How-
ever, as competence is an observable trait, whereas loyalty
is not, the competitiveness of an individual is largely de-
termined by her past performance (Lazear 2004, 159).
Officials typically lay the foundation for future advance-
ment at an early stage (Becker and Strauss 1956, 256). The
importance of early achievements is particularly well doc-
umented for careers within the military.7 Cadets who per-
form well at the academy have better chances of gaining
access to higher education facilities, where they acquire
management and leadership skills necessary to ascend to
the upper echelons. Without such training, officials are
likely to be stuck at midlevel ranks and lack the skills
for lucrative employment outside the security apparatus
(Biderman and Sharp 1968, 388).8
Due to these inherent characteristics of security or-
ganizations, low-performing officials face grim career
prospects. This pressures them into pursuing unortho-
dox routes by which they can climb up to higher ranks
(Kung and Chen 2011, 28). One way to improve their own
promotion prospects in such circumstances is to apply for
unpopular assignments where underachievers can stand
out from their peers (Becker and Strauss 1956, 257). We
argue that the secret police offers exactly such posts.
7In prototypical military organizations, “promotions are consis-
tently based on achievement criteria, which include relative stand-
ing in one’s graduating class from the military academy, [and]
attendance at advanced training centers” (Nordlinger 1977, 43).
Early performance is even important in nepotist regimes, as per-
sonal networks have less impact on promotions at lower ranks
(Moore and Trout 1978, 460–61; Sassoon 2016, 106–8).
8Civilian employers value managerial and leadership skills rather
than purely security-related proficiencies (Janowitz 1988, 64).
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In the name of protecting the regime, secret police
agents must spy on, intimidate, torture, and even kill
people. In contrast to regular police officers or soldiers,
agents do not use these measures against ordinary
criminals or foreign armies but “more or less arbitrarily
selected classes of the population” (Friedrich and
Brzezinski 1965, 22). This requires agents to regularly
perpetrate repression that defies moral norms, incurs so-
cial stigma, and entails high psychological burdens even
for trained specialists (Grossman 1996, 222–26; Huggins,
Haritos-Fatouros, and Zimbardo 2002, 214–31).9
Brazilian secret police officers, for example, “manifested
such stress-related symptoms as insomnia, hypertension,
fear, and depression [...] exacerbated by an inability to
talk about their work” (Huggins, Haritos-Fatouros, and
Zimbardo 2002, 15). Compared to service in the regular
security apparatus, secret police work is emotionally
much more “difficult, arduous, and exhausting” (Plate
and Darvi 1982, 128). High-performing officials, who
do not face career pressure, therefore have little incentive
to engage in burdensome secret police tasks (Browning
1998, 169). For underachievers, this reduces the competi-
tion from peers with hitherto superior achievements and
improves their prospects for promotion within the secret
police.
Furthermore, pressured officials with poor past per-
formance have an incentive to join the secret police be-
cause they can expect that those who carry out undesir-
able secret police tasks send a signal of commitment to
the regime. As secret police agents, they have the oppor-
tunity to build a reputation of being loyal and zealous—
characteristics that are highly valued by both superiors
and leaders. In the words of a Uruguayan officer, re-
pressive zeal was “rewarded by the authorities either in
promotion or in assignment” (Plate and Darvi 1982,
141). While officials have difficulties proving such re-
liability in the regular security apparatus (Moore and
Trout 1978, 455–56), secret police service allows agents to
manifest their loyalty. Underachievers may therefore hope
that their service in the secret police will not only improve
their prospects for promotion within the secret police it-
self but also open doors to higher ranks back in the regular
security apparatus. Anecdotal evidence suggests that un-
derachieving agents do indeed see their secret police ser-
vice as an opportunity to salvage their faltering careers.
In Nazi Germany, for example, police officers “blocked by
the ‘bottleneck’ of seniors ahead of them” sought to join
the Gestapo—anticipating that they “lacked any hope of
9Agents may also worry about future repercussions, as dictators’
henchmen are often the first to be held accountable (DeMeritt
2015).
status” otherwise (Browder 1996, 22, 83).10 Driven by the
hope of future reward and promotion, underachieving
officials are therefore likely to put themselves forward for
the secret police.
Regimes, on the other hand, have good reasons to ad-
mit underperformers to their key coercive unit and to not
counteract the self-selection of such officials. From the
perspective of leaders, underachievers are beneficial be-
cause they must diligently work toward the autocrat’s in-
terests to retain their career chances. For example, Alexan-
dru Drăghici, the former interior minister of Romania,
was well aware that his secret police agents “had a fairly
low level of training and general knowledge, but that these
shortcomings were compensated for by their powerful
revolutionary enthusiasm” (Deletant 2005, 304). By con-
trast, leaders who assign high-performing officials to serve
in the secret police must fear that their subordinates will
not execute unpleasant orders. Having lucrative career
options, competent officials make unreliable secret police
agents, as they are likely to stay passive when the regime
is under attack (Zakharov 2016).
In the extreme case, leaders have to worry that ca-
pable agents even use their competence to actively work
against the government or seize an all-dominant position
in the regime (Egorov and Sonin 2011; Geddes, Wright,
and Frantz 2018). Such risks are lower when it is not the
most capable officials but rather loyal mediocrities who
are entrusted with the leaders’ protection. In this way,
the regime can fully benefit from top performers working
within the regular security apparatus or the larger regime
bureaucracy while exploiting the career pressures of un-
derachievers to forge a loyal secret police. Finally, direct
superiors within the secret police, who joined the force
because of their own weak performances, should also fa-
vor less-skilled subordinates. Acting upon their own ca-
reer concerns, superiors hope that underachieving sub-
ordinates will not compete with or supersede them. This
strengthens the career prospects for agents with weak per-
formances. Given the overlapping incentives of the regime
and its agents, we expect that officials with inferior past
achievements are more likely to serve in the secret police.
Empirical Case
We focus on Argentina’s last dictatorship to unearth, tri-
angulate, and analyze data on officials in the secret police
10Similarly, Polish functionaries saw the secret police as a vehi-
cle for social advancement (Dudek and Paczkowski 2005, 243).
Paraguayan officials who “could not make it up the ranks” (Plate
and Darvi 1982, 134) took over the unpopular task of torture.
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and the surrounding security apparatus. Sparse infor-
mation has constrained research on authoritarian insti-
tutions (Barros 2016; Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018;
Policzer 2009). Past regimes thus offer the best oppor-
tunity to study secret police forces and their internal
composition (Balcells and Sullivan 2018). To the best
of our knowledge, the case of Argentina is unique in
that it permits us to systematically test whether and why
underperformers are more likely to serve in the secret
police.
Argentina’s Coercive System
The coercive system of 1970s Argentina comprised
regular law enforcement agencies and the military, as well
as a number of civil and military intelligence services.
The latter included the state intelligence secretariat, the
superintendence of the federal police, and the regular
intelligence agencies of the army, navy, and air force
(MJyDH 2015). Throughout Argentina’s modern history,
the army held a key position inside this system, repeatedly
intervened in politics, and ousted several democratically
elected governments (Potash 1996). Despite these
interventions, the army’s recruitment, training, and
promotion system resembled a prototypical security
organization with a hierarchical and meritocratic struc-
ture (Atkins and Thompson 1972).11 With an up-or-out
system in place, military officers faced considerable career
pressures from the outset. Figure 1 depicts the strong
relationship between early performance at the military
academy and subsequent advancement to the highest
positions. Cadets who graduated at the top of their
class were much more likely to rise to the general ranks,
whereas most graduates at the bottom of their class had
to leave the organization as midlevel officers.
Intelligence Battalion 601
Between 1975 and 1983, Argentina’s security forces faced
violent uprisings by two insurgent groups: the People’s
Revolutionary Army and the left-wing Peronist Mon-
toneros. In response, the military pressured the demo-
cratic government of Isabel Perón for far-reaching pow-
ers; by 1975, the army was in charge of all matters of
internal security (Heinz 1999, 621–33, 680–85). Despite
their authority, generals led by Jorge Videla ousted Perón
11Successful military careers typically featured good academy per-
formances, first assignments as junior officers, and advanced train-
ing at the Higher War School. High-performing midlevel officers
later managed larger units or acquired staff positions before be-
coming generals.
FIGURE 1 Graduate Performance and Career
Achievement
Note: The plot shows the relationship between offi-
cers’ performances at the military academy and sub-
sequent career achievements. Graduation rank gives
each officer’s placement relative to her respective co-
hort at the academy. The rank of zero identifies the
best-performing officers. Junior and midlevel officers
and general officers denote ranks at retirement. Gray
areas denote probability densities, dark areas indicate
interquartile ranges, and black lines give medians.
in March 1976. Political power now was in the hands of
a junta called the “National Process of Reorganization”
(Lewis 2002, 131–32).12
For the military, the insurgent uprisings constituted
clear signs of a Soviet-supported attempt to take over Ar-
gentina and indeed the Western Hemisphere. The junta
was convinced that the insurgent groups were only the
visible manifestations of a clandestine enemy that oper-
ated from within the Argentine society (Lewis 2002, 137–
43). Intelligence therefore turned into the key resource in
uncovering and destroying subversive networks. In this
context, Intelligence Battalion 601 became the secret po-
lice unit centrally responsible for the nationwide targeting
of thousands of alleged subversives (MJyDH 2015).
To streamline the state’s repressive capacities, the mil-
itary leadership established Battalion 601 as the single
12Our results are not affected by changes in junta personnel or rebel
capacity (see supporting information [SI], Section SI.4, 21–22).
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most powerful organization “to which all other security
units were subordinate” (Dinges 2004, 112). Directly re-
porting to the junta and the General Army Command,
the battalion possessed what Greitens calls “coordinat-
ing authority” (2016, 25).13 All conventional intelligence
agencies and regular army units had to pass their intelli-
gence on to 601 (MJyDH 2015, 11–29). Battalion agents
processed all incoming information before feeding it back
into the coercive system, as well as up or down the chain of
command. At the same time, 601 collected its own intelli-
gence and conducted a huge number of repressive opera-
tions. In short, “disappearance [was] 601 work” (National
Security Archive [NSA] 2002a, 1).
Internally, Battalion 601 consisted of three depart-
ments.14 Central de Contrainteligencia, in charge of
counterespionage, and Central de Apoyo, responsible for
logistics, were overseen by the battalion’s vice chief. The
third department, called Central Reunión, constituted
the operational heart of Battalion 601 and was in charge
of ground-level policing and capture-or-kill missions
(MJyDH 2015, 24–29). It enjoyed great autonomy and
reported to the chief of 601 only. To repress coarsely
defined target groups, Central Reunión harbored seven
task forces.15 The agents infiltrated organizations, spied
on citizens, and disappeared alleged subversives. Victims
were typically kidnapped and deported to one of the
secret detention and interrogation centers, where most
of them were tortured and eventually killed (Lewis 2002,
147–59).16
Transitioning to the Battalion
As Battalion 601 originated from the army, military of-
ficers could join the battalion and return to the regular
security apparatus with relative ease. Before entering 601,
officers had worked in conventional army units, on mil-
itary bases, or at army headquarters. In these positions,
most officers trained enlisted ranks and assisted superiors
with the administration of the army. Some of them also
commanded units in regular military operations against
insurgents (MJyDH 2015, 131–62). According to a former
601 agent, there were no specific entry requirements or
special processes governing the transition to the battal-
13See SI.2 (4) for visualizations of Argentina’s coercive system and
601’s central position.
14SI.2 (5) provides an organizational chart.
15SI.2 (5) offers information on the task forces.
16SI.2 (6) provides a mission report on a capture-or-kill operation
by 601 task force officers.
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ion.17 In general, every year soldiers could formally state
their preferences for serving at specific locations or join-
ing particular army units. Prospective secret police mem-
bers could voice their desire to serve in 601, which was
then decided on by the general staff. Figure 2 shows that,
in particular, junior officers switched over to the secret
police unit.18 Upon admission, 601 commanders unilat-
erally assigned agents to one of the departments within
the battalion. On average, agents served in the unit for al-
most 3 years. Many of them reentered the regular security
apparatus after their secret police service.
Internal Validity
The case of Argentina’s last dictatorship and its coercive
system allows us to test crucial components of our argu-
ment and to rule out alternative explanations. Argentina is
an ethnically and religiously homogeneous society. From
1890 to 1940, Prussian military advisors professionalized
the Argentine army, turning it into a merit-based organi-
zation (Atkins and Thompson 1972). Explanations based
on favoritism are therefore unlikely to confound our anal-
ysis.
Furthermore, 601 exclusively recruited members of
the Argentine officer corps, which enables us to compare
early career performances and isolate their effects. As part
of the regular armed forces, the battalion employed the
17Information is based on the authors’ interview with a former
Battalion 601 agent (August 2018).
18Colonels served as Battalion chiefs, and lieutenant colonels
headed individual departments. Regression results do not change
when we exclude midlevel officers (SI.4, 20).
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same military rank structure and promotion schemes—
which facilitated transitions to 601 and a smooth reinte-
gration into regular units afterward. Finally, formal entry
requirements and selection procedures did not change
during the junta’s rule. The case is therefore well suited
to empirically test our theory.
Data and Method
We compile an original data set to assess whether un-
derachieving officers were more likely to serve in Ar-
gentina’s secret police. Using recently published infor-
mation by the Argentine Ministry of Justice and Human
Rights, we identify all officers who served in Battalion 601
(MJyDH 2015). We link this list to data on each officer’s
professional career record (Figueroa 2008). These data
stem from more than 20 army and government archives,
offering unique information on all 4,287 army officers—
including all 152 Battalion 601 members who graduated
from the Colegio Militar de la Nación, the army’s offi-
cer academy. Our final data set comprises all 30 officer
cohorts who graduated between 1947 and 1975. In each
cohort, at least one officer served in 601. Officers who did
not serve in the battalion but worked in any other army
unit function as counterfactuals in the empirical analysis.
The unit of observation in our data set is the individ-
ual officer. Our dependent variable is binary, identifying
each officer who served in Battalion 601 at any point be-
tween 1975 and 1983.19 Officers who never joined the
battalion are coded as 0. Given the type of our dependent
variable, we employ logistic regressions with standard er-
rors clustered on officer cohorts in the main analysis.20
Our key independent variable is Graduation rank,
which measures each officer’s performance at the officer
academy relative to her cohort (Figueroa 2008).21 The
variable captures the relative educational performance at
the beginning of the officer’s career with
Graduation ranki, j =
(
Ranki − 1
Cohort size j − 1
)
∗ 100,
where Rank is the absolute position of an officer i among
her peers and Cohort size is the total number of cadets
19SI.1 (3) shows summary statistics.
20We replicate all results using matched samples and ordinary least
squares with birth province and cohort fixed effects (SI.4, 19, 23–
24).
21As in other officer academies, such as West Point, academic
achievements and military leadership performance accounted for
roughly 80% of the final grade, and the rest was a combination of
athletic performance and disciplinary record.
who graduated with officer i in cohort j. Graduation rank
ranges from 0 to 100, with larger values indicating worse
relative performances. Officers with excellent grades who
graduated at the top of their class receive a value of 0,
whereas underachieving officers who graduated at the
bottom of their class receive a value of 100. Higher val-
ues of Graduation rank should therefore predict greater
probabilities of serving in Battalion 601.
We include several pretreatment variables in the
statistical analysis to account for potential confounders.
Officers may have held strong ideological convictions or
come from influential social classes, which could have
affected their graduation performance and motivated
them to serve in the secret police. In Argentina, social
class and ideological convictions clustered in army
branches (Scharpf 2018). Nationalist officers of low so-
cioeconomic status mostly served in the infantry branch,
whereas cavalry officers usually came from influential
military families of the comparatively liberal upper class.
The binary variables Cavalry officer and Infantry officer
indicate whether an individual joined the respective
branch.
Performances at the academy may have also been
affected by the quality of primary education. Educational
quality is likely to influence professional achievements,
shape upward mobility, and correlate with willingness to
serve in 601. Since fine-grained socioeconomic data are
unavailable before 1975, we calculate the variable Home
literacy rate, measuring the literacy rate in each officer’s
home province (Lupu and Stokes 2009).22 The variable
Cadet age controls for an officer’s age upon entering the
academy. Young, ambitious cadets may have shown little
hesitation about serving in 601 to boost their careers,
while lacking the experience or skills needed to do well at
the academy.
We further account for the content of military train-
ing, as it may affect both performance and willingness to
join the secret police. Training under military government
is a proxy for exposure to repressive counterrevolutionary
training. It measures the share of training (percentage)
that cadets completed under former military rule
(Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014). Finally, graduation
results may hinge on the amount of time officers spent at
the academy. Officers may have taken more time because
they had problems completing the coursework, or as
a way to strategically reduce course load and improve
their grades. We therefore control for Training length,
measuring the number of months an officer spent at the
academy.
22Data are available only for election years. We code the literacy
rate of the first election year after the officer’s birth year.
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FIGURE 3 Battalion 601 Members vs. Other
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Note: For each graduation rank, a black dot shows the
difference in densities between Battalion 601 members
and officers in any other unit. Positive x-values indi-
cate that a given graduation rank was overrepresented
among 601 members. Negative x-values indicate that a
given graduation rank was underrepresented among 601
members.
Empirical Results
Were underachieving officers more likely to serve in Bat-
talion 601? Anecdotal evidence suggests that members did
indeed lack ability. In 1979, a 601 member who served as
an informant to the U.S. embassy acknowledged that the
unit did not consist of the “best men” (NSA 2002b, 7).
Descriptive evidence corroborates this statement. Figure 3
shows that, relative to other army units, in Battalion 601
low performers were overrepresented. This lends initial
support to our argument that underachieving officers
were more likely to serve in the secret police.
Turning to the results of the statistical analysis,
Table 1 shows that Graduation rank is statistically sig-
nificant and positively correlated with membership in
Battalion 601. Officers who underperformed at the mil-
itary academy were more likely to serve in the regime’s
secret police unit. The finding is stable across different
model specifications. Results for the control variables
show that the officers’ backgrounds also mattered. The
statistically significant, positive estimate for Infantry of-
ficer and the nonsignificant coefficient for Cavalry officer
show that infantry officers were more likely to serve in
601. This indicates that officers from lower classes with-
out extensive personal connections were more willing to
join the battalion. The positive, statistically significant
estimate for the variable Training under military govern-
ment indicates that officers who underwent training dur-
ing previous military dictatorships were more likely to
serve in the battalion. Cadets’ age, quality of primary ed-
ucation, and training length at the military academy are
not significantly correlated with battalion membership.
To gauge the effect size of our key finding, we calcu-
late predicted probabilities for an average infantry officer
across all values of Graduation rank, holding other con-
trol variables at their means (King, Tomz, and Wittenberg
2000). Figure 4 shows that an infantry officer who grad-
uated at the top of her class had an average probability of
0.025 (0.02–0.04) of serving in the battalion. For the same
officer graduating at the bottom of her class, the probabil-
ity of joining Battalion 601 was 0.09 (0.05–0.14)—a 360%
increase. This result shows that officers with weak perfor-
mance at an early career stage were more likely to serve in
the secret police. Next, we substantiate the core aspects of
our theoretical mechanism with empirical evidence.
Probing the Mechanism
Our argument consists of several steps. In security or-
ganizations with an up-or-out system, underperforming
officials face early retirement. Such officials have difficul-
ties in reaching higher ranks, as poor past performances
impair access to advanced training. In view of these grim
career prospects, officials are eager to join the secret po-
lice, as it offers a promising alternative way to stay in
the security apparatus and reach higher ranks. Regimes
can exploit the incentives of underachievers by accepting
them into the secret police. We offer evidence for each
step.
Early Performance and the Risk
of Retirement
The first component of our mechanism postulates
that up-or-out promotion systems produce great career
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TABLE 1 Logistic Regressions for Battalion 601 Membership, 1975–83
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Graduation rank 0.014∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Cavalry officer −0.780∗∗ −0.551 −0.563
(0.298) (0.308) (0.310)
Infantry officer 0.517∗∗ 0.507∗∗
(0.171) (0.173)
Home literacy rate 1.291 0.992
(0.694) (0.777)
Cadet age 0.001 0.006
(0.006) (0.005)




Constant −4.058∗∗∗ −3.968∗∗∗ −5.513∗∗∗ −7.176∗∗∗
(0.189) (0.190) (1.535) (1.469)
AIC 1,295.09 1,289.00 1,272.73 1,263.34
Wald  2 14.18∗∗∗ 20.86∗∗∗ 28.86∗∗∗ 44.34∗∗∗
Pseudo R2 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.04
Observations 4,287 4,287 4,216 4,216
Note: Coefficients with robust standard errors are clustered on cohorts.
∗p < .05, ∗∗p < .01, ∗∗∗p < .001.
pressures for underperforming officials. If correct, weak
achievements at the academy should increase both the of-
ficers’ risk of (early) retirement and likelihood of serving
in 601. We test this implication with a refined coding of
our dependent variable and assess how graduation rank
influences the probability of serving in any unit other than
Battalion 601, retiring from the army, or working in the
battalion.23 Results support our expectation. Predicted
probabilities, shown in Figure 5, indicate that strong
academy performance is positively correlated with longer
service in the army (a). In contrast, weak achievements
increase the likelihood of both retirement (b) and service
in 601 (c). Officers threatened by early retirement turned
to the battalion in the hope of salvaging their careers.
Limited Access to Advanced Training
We have argued that officials with weak graduation
results are stuck in the security apparatus because they
are less likely to receive advanced training—a prerequisite
for future promotions and a successful career. If correct,
23The coding for each officer is mutually exclusive due to the cross-
sectional data structure. See SI.3 (7, 9) for coding description of
the dependent variable and multinomial regression results.
graduation rank should be negatively correlated with the
likelihood of such training. To test this, we code a binary
variable indicating whether officers attended advanced
training centers.24 Results offer strong support for this
part of our mechanism. Predicted probabilities in Figure 6
show that officers with low early-career performance were
unlikely to undergo advanced training, and therefore
they were disadvantaged in the competition for lucrative
positions within and outside the coercive bureaucracy.
Rewards for Secret Police Service
Our mechanism also suggests that underachieving offi-
cials join the secret police in the hope of improving their
bleak career prospects. Qualitative evidence indicates that
many 601 agents gained access to advanced training at the
Higher War School over the course of their secret police
service. Upon completion, officers returned to regular
army units or the general staff. Some later transitioned to
Argentina’s federal and provincial police, or they pursued
careers in civil intelligence agencies. Few officers even left
24We code graduations at the Higher War School, Higher Technical
School, or Army Information School.
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FIGURE 4 Graduation Rank and Likelihood of Serving in Battalion 601
Note: The plot shows predicted probabilities for 601 membership with 95% confi-
dence intervals for an average infantry officer, who was 18 years old when entering
the academy, grew up in a province with an 83% literacy rate, and underwent about 4
years of training, half of it under military governments (based on Model 4 in Table 1).
FIGURE 5 Early Achievements and Career Outcomes
Note: The plots show predicted probabilities for career outcomes (a: continued service in army; b: retirement
from army; c: service in 601) at different graduation ranks with 95% confidence intervals (based on Model 2 in
Table SI.3.1, 9).
the security apparatus for positions in the state adminis-
tration (MJyDH 2015, 131–62).
Quantitatively, we analyze two reward types: service
time and rank at retirement. If secret police agents are
rewarded for their service, they should remain longer in
the security apparatus and ascend to higher ranks than
their peers. Using coarsened exact matching, we test
whether 601 membership increased service time and rank
at retirement.25 Figure 7 shows that officers of Battalion
25Officers are matched on graduation rank and cohorts to compare
individuals with similar track records. SI.3 (10–11) provides im-
balance statistics and regression results for both outcome variables.
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FIGURE 6 Early Career Performance and
Access to Advanced Training
Note: The plot shows predicted probabilities for ad-
vanced military training, with 95% confidence intervals
(based on Model 2 in Table SI.3.2, 9).
FIGURE 7 Battalion 601 Membership and


















Note: Plot shows density estimates for the total service
time in the army comparing matched officers with and
without service in 601; gray areas denote 95% confidence
intervals (based on Model 4 in Table SI.3.4, 10).
601 indeed served longer in the army than officers who
never joined the unit. On average, 601 membership
granted agents 16 additional months in the military. This
is a substantive but conservative effect estimate, since
several officers implicated in repression faced discharge
after the junta’s demise in 1983. The additional service
time came with higher military ranks at retirement as well
as gains in income and pension rights.26 The Argentine
regime rewarded agents for secret police service.
Internal Placement of Secret Police Agents
Drawing on theoretical literature (Egorov and Sonin
2011; McMahon and Slantchev 2015; Zakharov 2016),
our argument suggests that leaders can exploit the ca-
reer pressures of underachieving officials. This part of
our mechanism is most difficult to test. We therefore rely
on an observable implication inspired by anecdotal ev-
idence from Nazi Germany: The leadership was careful
to assign well-educated members of the secret police to
administrative positions, whereas agents with poor track
records were tasked with hands-on repression (Browder
1996, 187–88). For Argentina, this suggests that the junta
should have placed low-performing members in Cen-
tral Reunión of Battalion 601, which required the highest
loyalty and was most directly involved in ground-level
policing. The implication rests on the assumption that
incoming officers hoped for a positive impact from secret
police service on their career, but had little knowledge re-
garding which department within Battalion 601 would be
best suited to help them achieve this goal. We believe that
this is a plausible assumption given the secrecy surround-
ing the battalion’s internal structure and the information
by a former 601 member that leaders alone decided over
placements within the unit. To further rule out the pos-
sibility that agents knew about the respective purposes of
the different departments, the test exclusively focuses on
the initial positions of incoming members right after the
creation of Battalion 601 as the secret police.27
The refined dependent variable identifies the first
position that officers held within Battalion 601. It distin-
guishes between officers who served in Central Reunión
and officers who worked in another 601 unit. Graduation
rank should be positively correlated with the proba-
bility of serving in Central Reunión. Results from lo-
gistic regressions and Heckman selection models show
that low-performing officers were indeed more likely to
serve in Central Reunión when entering Battalion 601.28
The regime seems to have strategically exploited the ca-
reer pressures of underachieving individuals by assigning
them to specific branches of the secret police.
26SI.3 (11, 15–16) offers additional tests and visualizations, showing
that service in Battalion 601 increased the chances of reaching
higher ranks, particularly for officers with weak graduation results.
27We analyze internal placements in the first 5 years of the battal-
ion’s existence.
28See SI.3 (12–13).
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Internal Promotions
Finally, we have argued that career concerns of direct su-
periors might reinforce the dominance of underachievers
in the secret police. Superiors who have joined the secret
police due to their own career pressure should favor un-
derachieving subordinates, as these pose less competition
and are unlikely to supersede them. Since direct superiors
have little say in recruitment questions, but can influence
internal promotion decisions, we scrutinize promotion
patterns within Battalion 601. If superiors valued under-
achievers, graduation rank should have had less effect on
internal promotions than in the rest of the army. We code
a binary variable indicating whether agents advanced in
rank during their service in 601. The results from our sta-
tistical analysis suggest that performance at the military
academy is indeed an insignificant predictor of promo-
tions within the battalion (SI.3, 13, 16–17). The incentives
of direct superiors in the secret police seem to have mit-
igated the otherwise strong relationship between early
career performance and promotion prospects. This un-
derscores that secret police service provides underachiev-
ing officials with an exceptional opportunity to salvage
their career.
External Validity
Our findings can offer insights into numerous cases.
The organization of Argentina’s security apparatus
and the close association between the army and the
secret police are most representative of military regimes
(Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014). Similar historical
cases include the dictatorships of Brazil and Chile, whose
secret police forces also originated from the military
(Greitens 2016; Policzer 2009; Stepan 1988). The logic
of our theoretical argument should, however, also travel
to autocracies that have a strategic incentive to limit
institutional and personnel overlaps between the secret
police and the military. Hybrid and personalist regimes
often rely on security organizations like the regular police
or paramilitary forces (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz
2018; Hassan 2017). Although these organizations may
not employ strict up-or-out systems, their hierarchical
structure with a limited number of top posts generates
competition among junior officials. Resulting career
pressures are likely to produce similar incentives for
underachievers to join the secret police.
Our theoretical argument may also inform the com-
position of secret police forces in party-based regimes
where security and party apparatuses form “interlocking
pyramids” (Sassoon 2016, 38). Young party members of-
ten have to zealously carry out dirty work like surveillance
and intimidation to make it to the top (Svolik 2012, 168–
69), again closely resembling the career pressures of junior
Argentine army officers (Kung and Chen 2011, 28). Our
theory predicts that ambitious cadres with weak prospects
for advancement in the party hierarchy are likely to pro-
vide the human resources for secret police units within
such regimes.
This study might also speak to intelligence services
in democracies. Contrasting with autocratic secret police
forces that uphold the iron rule of despots, democratic
intelligence agencies are supposed to protect the general
public. Even though such service is surely less arduous,
threats to national security sometimes also require agents
in democracies to intervene in citizens’ rights through
nationwide spying or enhanced interrogation programs.
Such contingencies might deter high performers, whereas
officials under strong career pressure are not in the posi-
tion to decline assignments. Career concerns could there-
fore also shape the composition of democratic intelli-
gence units facing trade-offs between national security
and civil liberties.
Apart from that, several factors might moderate the
general applicability of our mechanism. First, senior of-
ficials of competing intelligence organizations might put
more emphasis on competence to outdo rival appara-
tuses. Such competition is common in coup-proofed per-
sonalist dictatorships. Second, over time, exceptionally
durable dictatorships might be better able to nurture
both competent and loyal secret police forces through
lifelong indoctrination efforts.29 Third, in stable and less
violent regimes, secret police work may be less arduous
and thus less well suited to demonstrate individual loy-
alty. This may increase the willingness of high performers
and reduce the incentives for underachievers to join the
secret police. Fourth, in societies with deep ethnic or so-
cial cleavages, some leaders may hope to ensure the loyalty
of secret police agents solely by recruiting from favored
groups. By contrast, even in highly polarized societies,
leaders who fear coups by competent individuals should
have an incentive to employ underachievers from within
favored groups and exploit their career pressures to max-
imize loyalty.
29The Argentine regime lasted for 8 years, which is marginally
longer than the most common regime spell and slightly shorter
than the median duration of all autocracies since World War I
(SI.2, 6).
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Conclusion
Why do underqualified agents dominate the secret police?
We highlight officials’ motivation for serving in secret
police organizations to explain this puzzle. In bureaucra-
cies, officials with limited past achievements are forced to
demonstrate their commitment in order to improve their
chances of gaining future promotions and lucrative posi-
tions. Under pressure to outperform their better-qualified
peers, such underachievers have large incentives to dili-
gently work in the key coercive unit and show their loy-
alty to the regime. Underachieving but ambitious officials
therefore fulfill the single most important requirement of
secret police agents—a strong personal interest in com-
pliance. Leaders who depend on a loyal secret police force
can expect individuals motivated by self-preservation to
loyally execute violence.
The quantitative analysis of Battalion 601, one of the
most notorious intelligence units in the Western Hemi-
sphere, provides empirical evidence for our argument.
Drawing on original individual-level data on more than
4,000 officers, we show that those who underperformed
early on in their careers were indeed more likely to serve in
the battalion. Our results also demonstrate why this was
the case. Top performers at the academy were more likely
to attain advanced training and high-ranking regime po-
sitions, whereas most low performers were stuck at mid-
dling ranks or even had to leave the military altogether.
Underperforming officials were under considerable ca-
reer pressure and therefore had an incentive to join the
secret police.
One key implication of this study pertains to the se-
curity apparatus within nepotist regimes, where loyalty
results from favored groups’ access to goods and posts.
Our argument suggests that individuals without influen-
tial networks or career patrons face constraints in reaching
the most lucrative regime positions. The lack of personal
connections can therefore generate the same pressures
as the shortage of merit in other regimes. As such, this
study may also explain puzzling cases where individuals
from excluded segments of society have served in key co-
ercive units. Similar to merit-based systems, sidelined or
even excluded agents should perceive secret police ser-
vice as a way to advance their careers within nepotist
regimes.
A second key implication concerns the institutional
roots of authoritarian stability. Conventional wisdom sees
patrimonial relations as key elements of a durable auto-
cratic architecture. By contrast, our study shows that an
institutionalized, meritocratic bureaucracy does not con-
tradict autocratic longevity. Hierarchical organizations
with established career trajectories and merit-based pro-
motion systems produce the incentives for unconditional
loyalty, which can be exploited by regimes. Even in such
an institutionalized apparatus, individuals may be willing
to serve their leaders and ruthlessly target societal oppo-
sition groups. This might be bad news for democracies,
where performance-based careers are the cornerstone of
the state apparatus. Our study explains how governments
can accomplish swift autocratic turns without major bu-
reaucratic resistance. Officials facing career pressures are
likely to serve as willing executioners, while their well-
placed peers remain silent bystanders.
Finally, this study also points to unintended conse-
quences of transitional justice measures. Our argument
implies that future punishment makes secret police ser-
vice even more costly. However, the looming risks of
discharge and incarceration are unlikely to fully drain
the pool of willing executioners, as the least competent
agents with the lowest career prospects will still gamble
on gains from loyal regime service. Imminent sanctions
may therefore entail increased suffering for civilians, as
poorly qualified agents lack the skills and incentives to
target regime enemies selectively.
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Kamiński. Warsaw: Institute of National Remembrance, 87–
161.
Brehm, John, and Scott Gates. 1999. Working, Shirking, and
Sabotage: Bureaucratic Response to a Democratic Public. Ann
Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Brooks, Risa. 1998. Political-Military Relations and the Stability
of Arab Regimes. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Browder, George C. 1996. Hitler’s Enforcers: The Gestapo and the
SS Security Service in the Nazi Revolution. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Browning, Christopher R. 1998. Ordinary Men: Reserve Police
Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland. New York:
Harper Perennial.
Cole, Wade M. 2015. “Mind the Gap: State Capacity and the
Implementation of Human Rights Treaties.” International
Organization 69(2): 405–41.
Conrad, Courtenay R., and Will H. Moore. 2010. “What Stops
the Torture?” American Journal of Political Science 54(2):
459–76.
Davenport, Christian. 2007. “State Repression and the Tyran-
nical Peace.” Journal of Peace Research 44(4): 485–504.
Deletant, Dennis. 2005. “Romania.” In A Handbook of the Com-
munist Security Apparatus in East Central Europe, 1944–1989,
ed. Krzysztof Persak and Lukasz Kamiński. Warsaw: Institute
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